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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reaction to management disclosures. Prior studies 
have overlooked the fact that analysts can react differently as a result of firm characteristics that can affect the 
management forecasts’ credibility and usefulness, as well as specific situation like SEO or management forecast 
characteristics itself. This study extends this line of research by considering firm characteristics after controlling for 
factors with respect to management forecast characteristics that may affect analyst reaction. I provide evidence that 
good news management disclosures by firms with high levels of conservatism have more impact to the analysts; 
therefore, analysts react more to good news management disclosures issued by firms with a high level of conservatism 
than good news management disclosures that are issued by firms with low levels of conservatism. Similarly, the study 
finds that analysts react less to bad news management disclosure issued by firms with a high level of conservatism. I 
also find that analysts have a stronger reaction to management disclosures announced by firms with strong 
governance and a lower level of managerial ownership. These results show that firm characteristics are also factors 
that are considered by analysts in the revision of their earnings forecasts following management disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines analyst reactions to management disclosures depending on firm characteristics. 
Prior studies have shown that analysts have an incentive to issue accurate earnings forecasts (Lim, 2001; 
Hong and Kubik, 2003) and an incentive to maintain a positive relationship with the firms that they 
follow (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998). The analyst reaction to management disclosure can be 
influenced by either of these two incentives. In this manner, Cotter et al. (2006) find that analysts quickly react to 
management disclosures and are more likely to issue final meetable or beatable earnings targets when management 
provides public disclosure. Following these studies, analyst reaction to management disclosures has been viewed from 
differing perspectives. Tan et al. (2010) show that the analyst forecasts reflect management disclosures to a greater 
extent if the prior management disclosure is accurate. This is because management disclosure that is historically 
accurate can convince analysts that current management disclosure is more credible than at times of inaccuracy. This 
study implies that analysts consider manager reputation in their forecasts immediately following the announcement of 
management disclosures. Additionally, Feng and McVay (2010) provide evidence that analysts consider the 
disclosures of firms that subsequently announce an equity offering to be more credible because the equity offering 
provides an incentive to please the firm (ex., underwriter selection). They find specific situations where analysts react 
differently to management disclosures. These efforts are valuable because they identify certain factors or situations 
that cause analysts to react differently to management disclosures. However, they examine single characteristics of 
management disclosures or managers’ disclosure pattern individually and did not adopt a whole firm perspective. 
Therefore, I examine whether the analysts consider the firm characteristics when they reflect management disclosure 
in their revisions. 
 
To examine the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reaction to management disclosures, I use two types of firm 
characteristics, accounting conservatism and corporate governance. First, with respect to accounting conservatism, I 
T 
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expect that analysts react stronger to management disclosures issued by firms with a greater level of conservatism 
because such a firm possesses a tendency to disclose their financial information conservatively and the information is 
also more credible (Kim and Pevzner, 2010). However, the opposite result, analyst reaction to management disclosure 
is negatively associated with the level of conservatism of the firm, comes out contrary to the prediction. Therefore, 
this study attempts to determine the results for this outcome by examining the effect using two divided samples, a 
sample incorporating the disclosure of good news and a sample incorporating the disclosure of bad news. Prior studies 
suggest that the financial reporting of a conservative firm is more credible; however, conservatism can also bias 
accounting numbers in a negative direction. Therefore, I predict that the effect can be different depending on whether 
the disclosure is composed of good news or bad news. Using these divided samples, the results show that with respect 
to good news disclosures, analysts react greater to the disclosures from firms with greater level of conservatism. 
However, with respect to bad news disclosures, analysts react less to disclosures from firms with higher level of 
conservatism. Because of the conflicting results between the two subsamples and the result that analysts react greater 
to bad news disclosures (Cotter et al., 2006), the result for the total sample is that disclosures from conservative firms 
result in less reaction from analysts, which is contrary to expectations. 
 
Second, with respect to corporate governance, I use two types of proxy, board independence and managerial 
ownership. If the level of board independence is high, then presumably the directors are monitoring and providing 
guidance to ensure that the disclosed information is credible and useful for shareholders. Therefore, analysts are more 
likely to reflect the disclosures issued by firms with greater board independence in their earnings forecasts. 
Additionally, higher-level ownership managers, who want to maximize private benefits opportunistically, can 
withhold information from or manipulate information that is divulged to outside investors or analysts (Baik and Yi, 
2007). Thus, disclosures issued by higher-level ownership managers may be less credible, and analysts are less likely 
to react to these disclosures. I find that the results from this study support these conjectures using governance variables. 
Overall, this study provides evidence that firm characteristics are considered by analysts in the revision of their 
earnings forecasts and that the content of the revisions are the result of reactions to management earnings disclosures.  
 
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, analyst behavior is important because analysts play a crucial role 
as information providers for financial markets. An examination of analyst behavior reveals the effectiveness of the 
analyst role and whether the information provided sufficiently reflects the factors that can affect the information’s 
credibility or usefulness. Second, this paper provides evidence that analysts consider and reflect whole firm 
characteristics in their revised earnings forecasts. This study finds that analysts react differently to management 
disclosures depending on the firm characteristics such as accounting conservatism, managerial ownership, and 
corporate governance, in addition to specific situations or management forecast characteristics. The evidence 
demonstrates that analysts consider management disclosure from a whole firm perspective when they react to the 
disclosures. Third, with respect to conservatism, a prior study finds that analyst earnings forecasts do not fully 
impound the implications of accounting conservatism (Pae and Thornton, 2010). However, I provide evidence that 
analysts understand accounting conservatism and that they consider a firm’s conservatism level in their revision of 
earnings forecasts to some degree. Fourth, the level of detail effect reveals that analysts react to management disclosure 
depending on the type of news (good news or bad news) and that different types of news are considered differently 
depending on firm characteristics, especially accounting conservatism, as a result of the nature of conservatism. For 
conservative firms, good news is indicative of really good news, whereas, for a less conservative firm, good news is 
not considered to be a positive indicator to the same extent. Depending on the conservatism level of the firm, not all 
good news is equally good, and not all bad news is equally bad. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces related research and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 explains 
the sample and research design. Section 4 describes the main results of the hypotheses tests. Section 5 reports the 
additional analyses, and finally, Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Existing studies investigate different analyst reactions depending on the characteristics of management forecasts and 
the timing of the forecast release. This type of study typically addresses two primary characteristics of management 
forecasts that affect analyst reaction to forecasts, credibility and usefulness. If the management disclosures are 
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considered credible and useful, then analysts credit these disclosures with more weight when revising earnings 
forecasts. Analysts consider management forecast characteristics, such as credibility and usefulness, when they revise 
earnings forecasts. Certain prior studies provide evidence that analyst reaction is different depending on the credibility 
of management forecasts using proxies for the credibility of management forecasts. Hassell et al. (1988), Williams 
(1996), and Cotter et al. (2006) suggest that if management disclosure is downward disclosure (i.e., bad news), then 
it is more credible. Managers possess an incentive to overstate current earnings and expectations for future cash flows 
to reflect efficient management and to maximize their compensation. Therefore, downward disclosure appears more 
credible because of this management-associated characteristic. Additionally, these studies find that analysts react 
greater to bad news disclosure. Tan et al. (2010) provide evidence to demonstrate that analysts react greater to 
management disclosure, if the prior management disclosure accuracy has been high, because the history of prior 
disclosure accuracy can cause analysts to think that management forecasting of a current period is also credible. 
 
Other papers examine different analyst reactions to management forecasts depending on the usefulness of the 
forecasts. Baginski et al. (1993) document that the more precise the management disclosure, the more useful it is. 
Feng and McVay (2010) find that analysts react significantly to precise disclosures and suggest that early disclosure 
is more useful to analysts because analysts have limited information concerning the earnings of newly established 
firms, and the management forecasts in this case contain useful information for analysts. They empirically find that 
analysts credit early management forecasts with significant weight. 
 
The prior literature suggests that analyst reaction to management forecasts differs according to management forecast 
characteristics. However, these prior studies consider each particular basic characteristic of management forecasting 
itself using proxies, such as good news and bad news, and not from the whole firm perspective. Can firm characteristics 
affect management forecast characteristics? If firm characteristics can affect management disclosure characteristics 
(credibility and usefulness), it may be assumed that firm characteristics may also have an effect on analyst reaction. 
Analysts have an incentive to react differently depending on the firm characteristics because of the effect of firm 
characteristics on management forecast credibility or usefulness. Therefore, I investigate the possibility that firm 
characteristics have an influence on analyst reaction to management disclosure in this study. 
 
Certain firm characteristics can affect management forecasting credibility and usefulness. First, I examine the 
conservatism level of the firm. A firm’s level of conservatism affects the management forecast characteristics. 
Conservatism forces earlier recognition of bad news that managers have an incentive to delay. Chen et al. (2007) argue 
that conservatism can reduce upward earnings management by recognizing earnings conservatively. LaFond and 
Watts (2008) document that conservatism reduces information asymmetry by increasing the speed with which negative 
information is revealed in the earnings. Management has an incentive, therefore, to overstate accounting earnings; 
thus, conservatism can render a firm’s financial results credible. Analysts can also perceive earnings announcement 
from conservative firms to be more informative and more credible, like investors (Kim and Pevzner, 2010). These 
prior studies focus on the role of conservatism with respect to manager earnings announcements. In the case of 
voluntary management disclosures, it is also true that management forecasts of more conservative firms are less 
optimistic and more informative. Therefore, I suggest that the management forecasts of conservative firms are more 
credible and useful and that analysts react more significantly to the management forecasts that are announced by such 
conservative firms. Therefore, I present Hypothesis 1. For convenience, I term the coefficient that indicates analyst 
response to management earnings forecasts the analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater for firms with a higher 
level of conservatism. 
 
I also examine the effects of accounting conservatism on analyst reaction by dividing management forecasts into two 
groups, good news forecasts and bad news forecasts, because conservatism can affect good news and bad news 
forecasts differently. When a good news management forecast is announced with respect to a less conservative firm, 
analysts can perceive this disclosure as less credible because this good news disclosure of a less conservative firm is 
optimistically biased. However, with respect to a conservative firm, good news disclosure is perceived to be more 
credible by analysts because good news by a conservative firm is relatively less biased as a result of conservative 
accounting tendency. Conversely, bad news disclosure by a less conservative firm can be perceived as more credible 
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than that of a conservative firm. If a conservative firm issues a good news management forecast, analysts are likely to 
consider this as really good news, because they are conservative when it comes to recognizing their earnings. Analysts 
recognize that this good news is released despite conservative reporting behavior and is, therefore, credible, and the 
analyst reaction is greater in response to a conservative firm’s good news disclosure than the disclosure of a less 
conservative firm. If a conservative firm issues bad news, then this disclosure is deemed bad news of little significance 
because the tendency of such a firm is to recognize earnings conservatively. A bad news management forecast from a 
conservative firm is perceived to be lacking in credibility and of little use to analysts. Therefore, I also hypothesize 
the following depending on the type of management forecast. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater in response to good news 
disclosures from firms with a higher level of conservatism. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater in response to bad news 
disclosures from firms with a lower level of conservatism. 
 
A firm’s governance structure is another firm characteristic that affects management forecast characteristics. The 
board of directors is the main corporate governance mechanism. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board of 
directors should monitor a firm’s management to mitigate the agency conflicts that result from the separation of 
ownership and control. The board of directors can effectively monitor managers when the directors are independent. 
Board independence is an indicator of strong governance. How does strong governance, such as an independent board, 
affect management forecast characteristics? Managers in firms with strong governance are monitored by the 
governance mechanism, and an independent board monitors the financial reporting process. Beasley (1996) find that 
a larger proportion of external board directors prevents financial statement fraud because external directors monitor 
the preparation of financial statements more effectively. Klein (2002) also find that independent boards are more 
effective in monitoring the financial accounting process and that independent boards prevent earnings management 
by managers. Additionally, Sengupta (2004) documents that firms with independent boards are likely to announce 
quarterly earnings earlier. Thus, a firm that possesses an independent board of directors releases useful and credible 
management forecasts because board pressure is more aligned with the interests of shareholders. Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
find that firms with external directors are more likely to issue a forecast and that these forecasts tend to be more 
specific and accurate. These prior studies imply that independent directors cause managers to issue credible and useful 
forecasts and analyst reaction to these management forecasts is also affected by this firm characteristic. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater for firms with a higher 
level of board independence. 
 
Managerial ownership is another firm characteristic that can also affect management forecast characteristics. 
Managers are agents that represent shareholders and often experience conflict between their private benefits and those 
of shareholders. Managers with sufficient ownership often pursue their own wealth to the detriment of shareholder 
benefits. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) model this problem and show that manager ability to conduct relationship-
specific investments and contracts can cause their replacement to be difficult, which permits them to extract greater 
wealth. Managers may, therefore, entrench themselves and pursue their own wealth. Morck et al. (1988) document 
that if managerial ownership is minimal, manager interest might align with external shareholder interest; however, 
higher levels of managerial ownership can result in greater manager entrenchment and increasing agency costs. From 
this entrenchment perspective, managers with a higher level of ownership who endeavor to maximize private benefits 
opportunistically can withhold or manipulate the information released to external investors or analysts (Baik and Yi, 
2007). Managers with a higher level of ownership are likely to disclose information that is beneficial to their own 
interests or to time the release of information opportunistically. Entrenched managers with a higher level of ownership 
may use management forecasts for their own interests rather than those of the shareholders. Thus, managers with a 
higher level of ownership may issue less credible and less useful management forecasts because of their opportunistic 
behavior with respect to management disclosure. Analysts are also not likely to reflect the management forecasts from 
managers with a higher level of ownership. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 4: The analyst response coefficient (ARC) for management forecasts is greater for firms with managers 
with a lower level of ownership. 
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample and data 
 
The data for the sample were extracted from the First Call database, which provides management disclosure, analyst 
forecasting, and actual earnings data, for the period 1995 to 2009.1 To measure the level of conservatism, I use the 
Compustat Annual and CRSP database. I also use CEO and top manager ownership data from the ExecuComp (in 
Compustat) database, corporate governance data from the Risk Metrics database, and quarterly financial statement 
data from the Compustat Quarterly database. The total management forecasts observations for this period is 57,848. 
I first exclude non-EPS forecasts, non-USD currency forecasts, and qualitative forecasts to measure management 
disclosure levels and analyst revision levels. Figure 1 illustrates that I also exclude forecasts issued before the date of 
the earnings announcement of the prior quarter and forecasts issued after the date of the earnings announcement of 
the current quarter to examine the pure effect of management forecasts on analyst forecast revisions. To calculate 
management disclosure levels, I exclude observations without preexisting analyst forecasts. For levels of 
conservatism, ownership, director, and other variables, I exclude observations for which these variables cannot be 
calculated. After all variables are accounted for, the final sample for empirical analysis is composed of 6,655 
observations.2 The detailed procedure of sample selection is reported in Table 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Timeline and variable measurement 
 
 
 
  
																																								 																				
1 As a result of data insufficiency, the sample period is from year 1995 to 2009. 
2 To eliminate outlier problems, I truncate the top and bottom 0.5% of the same continuous variables. With truncation of 1% and 2%, the results do 
not change qualitatively. 
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Table 1.  Sample selection procedures 
 Number of Forecasts 
Total forecasts 57,848 
Less:  
Non-EPS forecasts 1,783 
Non-USD currency forecasts 345 
Qualitative forecasts 8,063 
Duplicate forecasts 528 
Forecasts without CUSIPs 122 
Forecasts missing actual earnings data 656 
Forecasts issued before the earnings announcement date of the prior quarter 5,747 
Forecasts issued after the earnings announcement date of the current quarter 247 
Observations without analyst preexisting forecasts 21,017 
Insufficient observations for calculating average reputation 4,114 
Observations without stock price data 304 
Observations without conservatism measure data 2,543 
Observations without ownership data 3,422 
Observations without director data 1,695 
Observations in the financial services industries 232 
Observations without other control variables data 30 
Multiple disclosure issuances (retaining the most recent disclosure) 27 
The top and bottom 1% of management disclosure, analyst revisions, and conservatism measures 318 
Final sample 6,655 
 
Research Design and Variable Definitions 
 
The Empirical Model 
 
To investigate the reaction of analysts to management disclosure in the revision of earnings forecasts, I estimate the 
following regression model depending on firm characteristics: 
 
REACT = β0 + β1 GUIDE + β2 GUIDE FIRM_Char + β3 GUIDE REPUTATION + β4 
GUIDE DOWN + β5 GUIDE HORIZON + β6 GUIDE RANGE + β7 GUIDE ANALYSTS + β8  
FIRM_Char + β9 REPUTATION + β10 DOWN+ β11 HORIZON +β12 RANGE + β13 ANALYSTS + ε. (1) 
 
I follow the model used in Feng and McVay (2010) that investigates analyst reaction to management disclosure when 
revising their forecasts. This current study investigates analyst reaction to management disclosure and the differences 
depending on firm characteristics. Thus, the research design requires measuring the levels of public disclosure from 
managers and the subsequent analyst forecast revisions to earnings forecasts. Consistent with Feng and McVay (2010), 
I first measure the disclosure level of management forecasts (GUIDE) as the difference between the manager earnings 
forecast and the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. The 
preexisting consensus analyst forecast is the last revised consensus within 30 days prior to the management disclosure. 
To measure the analyst reaction level, I set REACT as the revised consensus of analyst forecasts minus the preexisting 
median consensus of analyst forecasts, scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. The revised consensus is the 
last revised consensus available within the 15 days following the management disclosure, and, if there is no revision, 
the preexisting forecast is used as the revised consensus (i.e., reaction is zero). This measure identifies the extent to 
which the analyst forecasts are revised after the management disclosure is released. 
 
This model investigates the association between management disclosure and analyst reaction. Analysts generally 
reflect management disclosure when they revise their forecasts; thus, β1 is expected to be positive. Using proxies for 
firm characteristics and controls, I calculate the interaction variables with GUIDE because my focus is on whether 
firm characteristics have an effect on the relationship between management disclosure and the level of analyst forecast 
revision. The control variables are factors that might affect the relationship between management disclosure levels 
and the reaction level of analysts. I use all firm characteristics variables at the fiscal year end of the year t-1 because 
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firm characteristics of year t cannot be identified by analysts at the moment that they revise their earnings forecast in 
reaction to management disclosure in the year t. 
 
The Proxies for Firm Characteristics 
 
This study investigates the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reaction to management disclosure. First, the 
independent variable FIRM_char uses five measures including accounting conservatism (CON), ownership measures 
(CEO_OWN, TOP_OWN), and board independence measures (B_INDEP, AC_INDEP). With respect to the measures 
for conservatism, I apply three types of individual measures (one representing conditional conservatism and two 
representing unconditional conservatism) and two types of aggregate measures representing the validity and the 
credibility of the proxies.  
 
The first measure of conservatism is CSCORE, following Khan and Watts (2009). Specifically, it is calculated by the 
following annual, cross-sectional regression model: 
 
Xi = β1 + β2 Di + Ri(µ1 + µ2 Sizei + µ3 M/Bi + µ4 Levi) + DiRi(λ1 + λ 2 Sizei + λ 3 M/Bi + λ 4 Levi) 
+ (δ1 Sizei + δ2 M/Bi + δ3 Levi + δ4 Di Sizei + δ5 Di M/Bi + δ6 Di Levi)+ εi  (2) 
 
From this regression model, the result is µj,t and λ j,t (j = 1 - 4) and, using these, I can calculate the incremental timeliness 
of bad news each year. 
 
The second measure of conservatism is CONACC, based on Givoly and Hayn (2000). This measure is derived from 
the concept that conservative accounting generates consistently negative accruals by accelerating bad news and 
decelerating good news. To compute this measure, I first calculate the values of total accruals (income before 
extraordinary items - cash flows from operations + depreciation expense) deflated by average total assets. I then take 
the mean over three years, centered on year t. By averaging the values, I can reduce the possible temporary effects on 
accruals because these transient effects are likely to disappear within two years (Richardson et al., 2005). I then 
multiply by negative one (-1) so that a larger value of the measure implies a greater level of conservatism.  
 
The third measure of conservatism is CONBM. Generally, conservative firms tend to understate the book value of 
equity compared to the market value of equity. For this reason, conservative firms will have a lower book-to-market 
ratio. I calculate CONBM as the book-to-market ratio multiplied by negative one (-1) because a higher value for the 
measure should indicate a higher level of conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2000). 
 
The other two measures of conservatism are CONAGG1 and CONAGG2. Following the concept used in Hui et al. 
(2009), I develop two aggregate measures because each of the three measures above contains some errors in gauging 
the level of conservatism. First, I calculate the rank of each firm’s conservatism level based on CSCORE, CONACC, 
and CONBM. CONAGG1 is the average value of these three ranks regardless of whether the measures indicate 
conditional or unconditional conservatism, and CONAGG2 is the average value of two ranks of unconditional 
conservatism measures (i.e., CONACC and CONBM). I adopt the mean of the rank values because the mean of the 
raw values might be biased by a dominant or extreme value. However, this method using the rank values may mitigate 
these possible biases. 
 
I examine board independence as a corporate governance mechanism. I use B_INDEP as a proxy for board 
independence, which is defined as the percentage of independent directors that belong to the full board of directors. 
This study uses two measures with respect to ownership, CEO_OWN and TOP_OWN. CEO_OWN represents the 
percentage of total shares held by the CEO to total outstanding shares, and TOP_OWN is the percentage of total shares 
held by the top five executives to total outstanding shares. This study uses CEO and top manager ownership measures 
as a firm characteristic because CEO or top manager-related factors can become an area of focus for analysts reacting 
to management disclosure. 
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Other Control Variables 
 
With respect to control variables, I first use two proxies for credibility that have already been used in prior literature, 
DOWN and REPUTATION. These proxies can directly affect the credibility of management forecasts. DOWN is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the manager’s disclosure is a downward disclosure (i.e., the management forecast is 
lower than the preexisting consensus of analyst forecasts) (e.g., Hassell et al. 1988; Cotter et al. 2006). Because 
managers possess an incentive to overstate the current financial situation to imply superior management and to 
maximize compensation, management disclosure may appear credible if it is a downward disclosure. REPUTATION 
is the average accuracy of management disclosure for the prior three years, where the accuracy is equal to 1, 0, and -
1 if the absolute value of the management forecast error is less than, equal to, and greater than the preexisting analyst 
forecast error, respectively. Therefore, REPUTATION is higher when the historical reputation of the management is 
superior. If historical reputation is superior in terms of management forecasting, then the likelihood that the current 
management forecast is accurate is also considered to be high (Tan et al., 2010). 
 
I also control for factors that can affect the usefulness of management disclosure, HORIZON and RANGE. HORIZON 
is the log of the number of days between the release date of management disclosure and the earnings announcement. 
If the number of days is low, limited information is available in the market, and the usefulness of management 
disclosure is high if HORIZON is high. RANGE measures the management disclosure precision by calculating the 
range of the forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter for a range forecast and 0 for a point 
forecast. If the management disclosure range is higher, the usefulness of the disclosure is lower. Additionally, I use 
ANALYSTS as a control variable for the log of the number of analysts following a firm because I use the measures 
based on the consensus analyst forecast. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables that are used in this study. The mean of REACT and GUIDE are 
-0.0012 and -0.0002, respectively, which are comparable to those reported in Feng and McVay (2010). The mean 
values of conservatism measures, CSCORE, CONACC, and CONBM are 0.0554, 0.0175, and -0.4333, respectively. 
The mean of CSCORE is lower than that reported in Khan and Watts (2009), but this may be because the sample 
period used by Khan and Watts (2009) differs from my sample. Including CSCORE, other measures of conservatism 
are consistent with those in prior literature with slight variations (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008). With respect to ownership, CEO has, on average, approximately 1.73% and the top five managers 
have approximately 2.68% of total shares outstanding. For the DOWN variable, the mean value is 0.4972; this implies 
that the downward disclosure relative to the preexisting consensus of analyst forecasts is approximately 50% percent 
of the total management disclosure contained in the sample. 
 
The correlation coefficients for the independent and the dependent variables are untabulated. In the untabulated results, 
I find that the correlation between REACT and GUIDE is significantly positive. The majority of the correlations 
between conservatism measures and REACT are positive and significant with the exception of CSCORE and REACT. 
The ownership variables are negatively correlated with REACT (-0.028, -0.020), and the board independence variables 
are positively correlated with the analyst reaction variable (0.016, 0.000). 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Median Min. 25% 75% Max. 
REACT -0.0012 0.0040 0.0000 -0.0413 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0098 
GUIDE -0.0002 0.0063 0.0000 -0.0996 -0.0015 0.0015 0.0266 
CSCORE 0.0554 0.0876 0.0710 -0.4375 0.0202 0.1105 0.4293 
CONACC 0.0175 0.0400 0.0129 -0.1381 -0.0047 0.0339 0.2559 
CONBM -0.4333 0.2501 -0.3738 -1.8135 -0.5506 -0.2558 -0.0679 
CONAGG1 3.3280 0.9588 3.3093 0.4243 2.6343 4.0178 6.4640 
CONAGG2 3.3280 1.3796 3.2995 0.1365 2.3160 4.2920 6.5650 
CEO_OWN 0.0173 0.0421 0.0028 0.0000 0.0009 0.0097 0.3466 
TOP_OWN 0.0268 0.0527 0.0068 0.0001 0.0025 0.0206 0.3903 
B_INDEP 0.7003 0.1595 0.7143 0.1111 0.6000 0.8333 1.0000 
AC_INDEP 0.9302 0.1596 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
DOWN 0.4972 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
REPUTATION 0.0122 0.6823 0.0000 -1.0000 -0.6000 0.5556 1.0000 
HORIZON 3.9953 0.7736 4.4308 0.0000 3.5553 4.5109 6.7957 
RANGE 0.0014 0.0017 0.0009 0.0000 0.0004 0.0018 0.0386 
ANALYSTS 2.2912 0.5899 2.3026 0.0000 1.9459 2.7081 3.5835 
The sample includes 6,655 observations from 1995 to 2009. The variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Results for Conservatism 
 
The Results for the Tests of Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1) for each five measures of conservatism. I hypothesize that 
the ARC for management forecasts is positive for those firms that exhibit higher levels of conservatism. To be 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, β2 should be positive; however, the results show that the coefficient of the interaction 
variable GUIDE*CON is significantly negative across all five measures of conservatism. The result implies that 
analyst reaction is greater in response to management forecasts from firms with lower levels of conservatism, which 
is contrary to my prediction. I defer the explanation of these results to the next subsample analysis section. The 
coefficients of the GUIDE*DOWN and GUIDE*REPUTATION variables are significantly positive for all measures 
of conservatism. This implies that analyst reaction is greater in response to downward management forecasts and to 
the management forecasts from firms with a higher level of historical management forecast accuracy, which is 
consistent with my prediction and those of prior studies. Additionally, I find that analysts lend more weight to the 
disclosure when the range of management disclosure is greater and more analysts follow the firm. 
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Table 3. Revision magnitude on conservatism (Full sample, Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted sign 
Conservatism measures (CON) 
CSCORE CONACC CONBM CONAGG1 CONAGG2 
Intercept  0.0003
* 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0002  0.0001  
(1.78) (1.45) (1.96) (0.83) (0.78) 
GUIDE + 0.0697
** 0.0311 -0.1166*** 0.1006*** 0.0533** 
(2.54) (1.23) (-4.08) (3.71) (2.12) 
GUIDE*CON + -0.1402
** -0.3281*** -0.1690 *** -0.0224*** -0.0167*** 
(-2.50) (-4.51) (-11.50) (-5.80) (-5.76) 
GUIDE*DOWN + 0.3483
*** 0.3627*** 0.3585 *** 0.3586*** 0.3606*** 
(29.27) (30.09) (30.20) (30.14) (29.76) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 0.2980
*** 0.2951*** 0.2752 *** 0.2940*** 0.2877*** 
(49.03) (50.20) (45.40) (50.02) (48.05) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + -0.0095
* -0.0072 -0.0026  -0.0055 -0.0056  
(-1.89) (-1.43) (-0.52) (-1.08) (-1.10) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 3.3254
*** 3.8800*** 0.9973  3.1746*** 3.4642** 
(3.12) (3.62) (0.92) (2.98) (3.25) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.1288
*** 0.1365*** 0.1498*** 0.1322*** 0.1419*** 
(18.79) (21.53) (23.41) (20.81) (22.01) 
CON  -0.0006
** 0.0012** 0.0001  0.0000  0.0001*** 
(-2.03) (2.01) (1.06) (0.97) (3.21) 
DOWN  -0.0008
*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
(-12.75) (-12.61) (-14.08) (-12.97) (-13.15) 
REPUTATION  0.0004
*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
(10.39) (10.08) (9.72) (9.94) (10.22) 
HORIZON  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  (0.22) (-0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (-0.10) 
RANGE  -0.0972
*** -0.0940*** -0.0983*** -0.0948*** -0.0904*** 
(-5.90) (-5.70) (-5.87) (-5.75) (-5.46) 
ANALYSTS  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  (0.18) (0.79) (0.62) (1.09) (0.19) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
# of obs.  6,655 6,655 6,655 6,655 6,655 
Adjusted R2  0.7605 0.7611 0.7651 0.7614 0.7617 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter. Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
The Results for the Tests of Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
 
To perform further analyses, I divide the sample into two groups according to whether the management forecasts are 
downward or upward disclosures. The results of the tests using these subsamples are presented in Table 4. Using the 
good news disclosure sample and five conservatism measures that I used in the full sample analysis shown in panel 
A, the results for the majority of the conservatism measures are that analyst reactions are significantly and positively 
associated with levels of conservatism. This implies that analyst reaction is greater in response to good news from 
firms with a higher level of conservatism, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2a. Similarly, the results in panel B 
support Hypothesis 2b and show negative coefficients of GUIDE*CON across all measures of conservatism. 
Therefore, according to the type of management disclosure, conservatism affects analyst reaction. The results of the 
full sample may be found by summing up these two opposite effects of conservatism. However, the effects of 
downward disclosures are dominant because analysts lend more credibility to downward disclosures (e.g., Williams, 
1996). Thus, the full sample results can be explained by the dominant effects of conservatism on downward 
management disclosures. The coefficients of the control variables are similar to the full sample analysis results with 
the exception of the significance level.  
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Table 4.  Revision magnitude on conservatism (Good vs. Bad news disclosure) 
Panel A. Good news disclosure (Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted sign 
Conservatism measures (CON) 
CSCORE CONACC CONBM CONAGG1 CONAGG2 
Intercept  0.0003 0.0003
* -0.0001 0.0005** 0.0004* 
(1.53) (1.75) (-0.53) (2.46) (1.95) 
GUIDE + 0.3776 0.3553
*** 0.4287*** 0.3094*** 0.3344*** 
(10.51) (10.57) (11.39) (8.21) (9.80) 
GUIDE*CON + -0.1136
* 0.3952*** 0.0999*** 0.0150*** 0.0156*** 
(-1.65) (3.02) (4.62) (2.79) (4.12) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 0.2966
*** 0.2918*** 0.3025*** 0.2972*** 0.2969*** 
(29.54) (28.92) (29.94) (29.63) (29.63) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + -0.0268
*** -0.0243*** -0.0281*** -0.0268*** -0.0269*** 
(-4.19) (-3.79) (-4.40) (-4.19) (-4.21) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 4.9690 4.6800 7.0895
** 5.5044 6.4719 
(1.44) (1.37) (2.05) (1.60) (1.87) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.0070 0.0069 0.0039 0.0124 0.0023 (0.71) (0.75) (0.41) (1.36) (0.24) 
CON  0.0000 0.0009 -0.0006
*** -0.0001 0.0000* 
(0.15) (1.20) (-4.84) (-2.19) (-1.94) 
REPUTATION  0.0002
*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(4.56) (4.79) (3.80) (4.50) (4.66) 
HORIZON  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-0.74) (-0.96) (-0.49) (-0.70) (-0.68) 
RANGE  -0.0059 -0.0069 -0.0281 -0.0097 -0.0124 (-0.28) (-0.33) (-1.30) (-0.46) (-0.58) 
ANALYSTS  0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
* 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.80) (0.73) (1.95) (0.82) (1.35) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
# of obs.  3,346 3,346 3,346 3,346 3,346 
Adjusted R2  0.3353 0.3391 0.3401 0.3361 0.3379 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(Table 4, Panel B continued on text page) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
 
Panel B. Bad news disclosure (Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted 
sign 
Conservatism measures (CON) 
CSCORE CONACC CONBM CONAGG1 CONAGG2 
Intercept  -0.0027
*** -0.0031*** -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0031*** 
(-7.35) (-8.91) (-10.30) (-7.46) (-8.94) 
GUIDE + 0.1838
*** 0.1034** -0.1833*** 0.2142*** 0.1370*** 
(4.09) (2.49) (-3.90) (4.84) (3.32) 
GUIDE*CON 
- -0.3500*** -0.5524*** -0.3133*** -0.0382*** -0.0322*** 
(-3.37) (-4.82) (-12.42) (-5.61) (-6.03) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 0.3005
*** 0.2874*** 0.2519*** 0.2886*** 0.2721*** 
(29.69) (30.74) (26.38) (30.92) (28.23) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + 0.0108 0.0185
* 0.0306*** 0.0236** 0.0250** 
(1.13) (1.91) (3.25) (2.41) (2.55) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 0.4017 1.7938 -4.8314
*** 0.2698 0.6834 
(0.24) (1.07) (-2.86) (0.16) (0.42) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.2188
*** 0.2382*** 0.2652*** 0.2282*** 0.2483*** 
(18.29) (22.31) (24.84) (21.18) (22.87) 
CON  -0.0020
*** -0.0020* -0.0008*** -0.0001* 0.0000 
(-3.17) (-1.73) (-3.71) (-1.74) (-0.56) 
REPUTATION  0.0006
*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
(7.86) (7.24) (6.19) (7.32) (6.76) 
HORIZON  0.0002
*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002 
(2.72) (2.94) (3.69) (3.18) (3.21) 
RANGE  -0.1617
*** -0.1456*** -0.1965*** -0.1570*** -0.1524*** 
(-5.56) (-4.96) (-6.69) (-5.40) (-5.24) 
ANALYSTS  0.0007
*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 
(8.07) (10.20) (10.95) (9.98) (9.83) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
# of obs.  3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 
Adjusted R2  0.7568 0.7574 0.7678 0.7581 0.7590 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Results for Corporate Governance 
 
The results for corporate governance are presented in Table 5. The first column shows the result for the board 
independence variable, and the last two columns present the results for the ownership variables. In the first column, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find a significantly positive relationship between the analyst reaction to management 
disclosure and board independence at the 1% significance level. I conclude that analysts lend more credibility to 
management disclosures that are announced by firms with a higher level of board independence in the revising of 
earnings forecasts. Similarly, I find that a firm’s managerial ownership is significant (at the 1% level) and negatively 
related to analyst reaction following management disclosures, which is presented in the second and third columns of 
Table 5. These results support that analysts lend credibility to disclosures when firm managers have a lower level of 
ownership, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. Other variables are similar to those reported in previous tables. 
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Table 5.  Revision magnitude on corporate governance (Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted sign Corporate governance measures (GOV) B_INDEP CEO_OWN TOP_OWN 
Intercept  0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 (-0.12) (1.20) (1.28) 
GUIDE + -0.0352 0.1354
*** 0.2015*** 
(-1.24) (5.15) (7.47) 
GUIDE*GOV + / - 0.1503
*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
(5.96) (-11.39) (-15.04) 
GUIDE*DOWN + 0.3561
*** 0.3561*** 0.3627*** 
(30.07) (30.34) (31.08) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 
0.2886*** 0.2937*** 0.2851*** 
(48.42) (50.35) (48.91) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + -0.0131
*** -0.0069 -0.0097** 
(-2.60) (-1.38) (-1.96) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 2.5957
** 4.2095*** 4.1902*** 
(2.43) (3.97) (3.99) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.1299
*** 0.1219*** 0.1104*** 
(20.30) (19.08) (17.09) 
GOV  0.0004
** 0.0000 0.0000 
(2.51) (-0.17) (-0.46) 
DOWN  -0.0008
*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
(-12.62) (-12.62) (-12.48) 
REPUTATION  0.0004
*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
(10.29) (10.47) (10.54) 
HORIZON  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.02) (0.09) (-0.04) 
RANGE  -0.1024
*** -0.0972*** -0.0969*** 
(-6.23) (-5.96) (-5.98) 
ANALYSTS  0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 (0.90) (1.19) (1.34) 
# of obs.  6,655 6,655 6,655 
Adjusted R2  0.7616 0.7647 0.7680 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
Alternative Measures for Corporate Governance 
 
To test for the effects of corporate governance on analyst reaction to management disclosure, I use a board 
independence measure and two managerial ownership measures. To check for robustness, I re-examine the corporate 
governance tests using alternative governance measures, INST_OWN and CEO_CHAIR_SEP. The measure 
INST_OWN represents institutional ownership measured as a percentage of total shares that are held by institutions to 
total outstanding shares. The measure CEO_CHAIR_SEP indicates whether the CEO of the firm is also the chair of 
the board, and it is measured as 1 if the CEO is not the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. The results for the tests of 
the effects of corporate governance using these two alternative measures are documented in Table 6. The results show 
that the greater the institutional ownership, the greater the impact on analyst reaction to management disclosures 
because the shareholders possess a powerful monitoring role. The results also show that if the CEO of the firm is not 
the chair of the board, then analyst reaction is greater in response to management disclosures issued from the firm. 
This is because if the CEO of the firm also has a role as chair of the board, then the board member monitoring activities 
will be restricted by the CEO. These results further confirm my predictions concerning corporate governance. 
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Table 6. Alternative measures of corporate governance (Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted 
sign 
Corporate governance measures (GOV) 
INST_OWN CEO_Chair_Sep 
Intercept  0.0017
*** 0.0015*** 
(5.93) (5.93) 
GUIDE + 0.0784
*** 0.1204*** 
(2.67) (4.86) 
GUIDE*GOV + 0.1005
*** 0.0579*** 
(4.19) (7.37) 
GUIDE*DOWN + 0.6261
*** 0.6296*** 
(47.7) (48.14) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 0.1768
*** 0.1806*** 
(25.89) (26.64) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + 0.0032 0.0028 (0.65) (0.56) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 4.1312
*** 3.9250*** 
(2.86) (2.73) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.0227
*** 0.0252*** 
(3.37) (3.77) 
GOV  -0.0003
** -0.0001* 
(-2.25) (-1.92) 
DOWN  -0.0004 -0.0004
*** 
(-7.80) (-7.65) 
REPUTATION  0.0004
*** 0.0004*** 
(12.87) (12.60) 
HORIZON  -0.0001
*** -0.0001*** 
(-3.30) (-3.45) 
RANGE  -0.0190 -0.0113 (-1.27) (-0.76) 
ANALYSTS  0.0000 0.0000 (-1.09) (-0.91) 
# of obs.  4,871 4,871 
Adjusted R2  0.8541 0.8552 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
The Endogeneity Issue 
 
I use the conservatism measures as independent variables to examine the effects of firm characteristics on analyst 
reaction to management disclosures. However, it is likely that the level of conservatism can be endogenously decided. 
Thus, I repeat the tests of conservatism using a two-stage least squares regression method. I use the firm characteristic 
variables that can affect the level of conservatism as instrument variables according to prior literature (Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). In Table 7, Panel A reports the results of the second stage 
regression of two-stage least squares regression using the good news disclosure sample, and Panel B shows the results 
using the bad news disclosure sample. With the exception of certain models, the results are similar to those reported 
in Table 4, which support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
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Table 7.  Revision magnitude on conservatism (Two-Stage Least Squares Regression) 
Panel A. Regression results of the second stage regression (Good news disclosure, Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted sign 
Conservatism measures (CON) 
CSCORE CONACC CONBM CONAGG1 CONAGG2 
Intercept  0.0004
* 0.0002 0.0007*** -0.0002 0.0000 
(1.85) (1.21) (3.05) (-0.69) (-0.14) 
GUIDE + 0.3863
*** 0.3583*** 0.3864*** 0.3495*** 0.3488 
(10.96) (10.62) (10.27) (9.55) (10.22) 
GUIDE*CON + -0.1640
*** 0.3978*** 0.0323* 0.0030 0.0081** 
(-2.76) (3.69) (1.74) (0.66) (2.48) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 0.2947
*** 0.2909*** 0.2982*** 0.2955*** 0.2950*** 
(29.28) (28.60) (28.83) (29.17) (29.16) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + -0.0277
*** -0.0255*** -0.0281*** -0.0275*** -0.0275*** 
(-4.35) (-3.98) (-4.33) (-4.29) (-4.28) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 6.7450
* 6.3692* 6.3580* 6.6208* 6.8596* 
(1.94) (1.83) (1.80) (1.90) (1.96) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.0045 0.0063 0.0084 0.0115 0.0059 (0.47) (0.67) (0.89) (1.25) (0.63) 
CON  -0.0007 0.0043
** 0.0008*** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 
(-1.01) (2.44) (3.32) (2.55) (2.96) 
REPUTATION  0.0002
*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(4.53) (4.75) (4.71) (4.45) (4.84) 
HORIZON  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-0.73) (-0.80) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.67) 
RANGE  0.0073 0.0045 0.0184 0.0063 0.0124 (0.33) (0.20) (0.82) (0.28) (0.56) 
ANALYSTS  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 (0.34) (0.67) (0.20) (1.14) (0.36) 
# of obs.  3,346 3,346 3,346 3,346 3,346 
Adjusted R2  0.3358 0.3364 0.3290 0.3325 0.3348 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
Instrument variables: SIZE, DEBT, CFO, CSALES, LITI, and BIG4 
Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(Table 7, Panel B continued on text page) 
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(Table 7 continued) 
 
Panel B. Regression results of the second stage regression (Bad news disclosure, Dependent variable = REACT) 
 Predicted sign 
Conservatism measures (CON) 
CSCORE CONACC CONBM CONAGG1 CONAGG2 
Intercept  -0.0026
*** -0.0033*** -0.0021*** -0.0028*** -0.0040*** 
(-6.67) (-9.39) (-4.50) (-5.24) (-9.41) 
GUIDE + 0.1190
*** 0.0426 -0.1386*** 0.1625*** 0.0811* 
(2.65) (1.02) (-2.87) (3.69) (1.93) 
GUIDE*CON - -0.2853
*** -0.6988 -0.2104*** -0.0389*** -0.0319*** 
(-2.89) (-6.77) (-9.58) (-6.39) (-6.81) 
GUIDE*REPUTATION + 0.2603
*** 0.2493*** 0.2297*** 0.2508*** 0.2350*** 
(25.43) (25.86) (22.49) (26.03) (23.56) 
GUIDE*HORIZON + 0.0054 0.0161
* 0.0212** 0.0184* 0.0212* 
(0.56) (1.65) (2.10) (1.86) (2.14) 
GUIDE*RANGE - 8.2291
*** 10.2837*** 4.6583*** 8.4691*** 8.4307*** 
(4.55) (5.63) (2.48) (4.73) (4.70) 
GUIDE*ANALYSTS ? 0.2361
*** 0.2525*** 0.2656*** 0.2434*** 0.2603*** 
(20.08) (23.68) (23.57) (22.60) (23.88) 
CON  -0.0056
*** -0.0033 0.0025*** -0.0002* 0.0002** 
(-4.55) (-0.83) (4.40) (-1.68) (2.33) 
REPUTATION  0.0006
*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
(6.75) (6.07) (5.93) (6.20) (5.82) 
HORIZON  0.0002
*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
(2.92) (3.34) (3.12) (3.51) (3.55) 
RANGE  -0.1487
*** -0.1438*** -0.1309*** -0.1522*** -0.1442*** 
(-4.74) (-4.64) (-4.05) (-4.92) (-4.64) 
ANALYSTS  0.0007
*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 
(7.65) (10.70) (9.26) (10.05) (9.95) 
# of obs.  3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 
Adjusted R2  0.7497 0.7542 0.7430 0.7535 0.7525 
The dependent variable, REACT, is calculated by revised consensus of analyst forecasts - preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts scaled 
by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
Instrument variables: SIZE, DEBT, CFO, CSALES, LITI, and BIG4 
Other detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. All regressions control the industry and year fixed effect. 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the effect of firm characteristics on analyst reactions to management disclosures. Unlike prior 
studies, I focus on the firm characteristics rather than general management forecast characteristics or analyst-specific 
characteristics. Using various conservatism measures, I find that analyst reaction is greater in response to good news 
management disclosures from firms with a higher level of conservatism and bad news management disclosures from 
firms with a lower level of conservatism. This finding demonstrates that care should be taken in explaining the effect 
of conservatism on analyst reaction to management disclosures because the effect is different depending on the type 
of management disclosure using both full sample and subsample analysis. I also find that analyst reaction is greater in 
response to management disclosures from firms with a higher level of board independence or a lower level of 
managerial ownership. This implies that the corporate governance structure is a consideration of analysts in the 
revision of their forecasts following management disclosures. All of the results hold after controlling for general 
management forecast characteristics or other general variables that are likely to affect analyst reaction to management 
disclosures. I provide evidence that firm characteristics are considered by analysts when they reflect the management 
disclosures in their revisions. Therefore, my findings are consistent with the fact that analysts are interested in certain 
firm characteristics as a method to estimate the credibility or usefulness of management disclosures. This study extends 
the literature concerning financial analysts; however, it also has limitations. Future study is required to examine other 
effects that this study does not address, such as the effects of market reaction to management disclosure on the analyst 
reactions to this management disclosure. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
The variable definitions 
Variable name Definition 
GUIDE 
Management earnings forecast - the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts, scaled by price at 
the beginning of the quarter (where the preexisting consensus analyst forecast is the last revised consensus 
within 30 days prior to management disclosure). 
REACT 
Revised consensus of analyst forecasts - the preexisting median consensus of analyst forecasts, scaled by 
price at the beginning of the quarter (where the revised consensus is the last revised consensus available 
in the 15 days following the management disclosure, and if there is no revision, the preexisting forecast 
is used as the revised consensus) 
CSCORE Conservatism measure in Khan and Watts (2009). Detailed procedures are explained in Section 3.2.2. 
CONACC Conservatism measure using accruals from Givoly and Hayn (2000), calculated by (income before extraordinary items - cash flows from operations + depreciation expense) divided by average total assets. 
CONBM Conservatism measure from Beaver and Ryan (2000), calculated by book-to-market ratio multiplied by negative one (-1). 
CONAGG1 Average rank of CSCORE, CONACC, and CONBM. 
CONAGG2 Average rank of CONACC and CONBM. 
CEO_OWN The percentage of total shares held by the CEO to total outstanding shares. 
TOP_OWN The percentage of total shares held by the top-five executives to total outstanding shares. 
B_INDEP The percentage of directors that are independent in the board of directors. 
AC_INDEP The percentage of directors that are independent in the audit committee. 
DOWN Equal to 1 if the manager’s disclosure is below the preexisting consensus of analyst forecasts and 0 otherwise. 
REPUTATION 
The mean value of management disclosure accuracy over three years centered on year t, where the 
accuracy is equal to 1, 0, and -1 if the absolute value of the management forecast error is less than, equal 
to, and greater than the preexisting analyst forecast error. 
HORIZON The log of the number of days between the release of a management forecast and the actual earnings announcement. 
RANGE The range of the management forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter for a range forecast, and 0 for a point forecast. 
ANALYSTS The log of the total number of analyst forecasts used in consensus following a management forecast. 
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NOTES 
